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ABSTRACT
Measuring Malware Evolution
by Poonkodi Ponnambalam
In this research, we simulate the effect of code evolution by applying a variety of
code morphing strategies. Specifically, we consider code substitution, transposition,
insertion, and deletion. We then analyze the effect of these code morphing strategies
relative to a variety of malware scores that have been considered in previous research.
Our goal is to gain a better understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of these
various malware scoring techniques. This research should prove useful in designing
more robust scores for detecting malware.
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CHAPTER 1
The Introduction
Computer software is a set of instructions that is given to a computer to perform
precise tasks. Each instruction is a specific command to the processor to do a certain
operation, such as transform data from one form to another. In this era, software
plays a role in virtually all aspects of life, from the financial markets on Wall Street,
to controlling space stations, to protecting national security, to playing angry birds
on a smart phone. Given that this is the case, it is not surprising that software is a
prime target of criminals who want to access user data, or otherwise profit from their
illicit activities.
Any malicious code that is designed to damage a computer systems is known as
malware. Malware writers regularly introduce new features and techniques designed
to enable their malware to evade detection. Typically, existing malware is modified
to make new malware, rather than starting over from scratch [36]. Thus, malware
can be viewed as evolving over time. As in any software development, it is easier
to reuse existing code than begin with a blank slate. This is why malware writers
tend to reuse previous malware code extensively and release new variants of the same
malware [1].
It is important to understand malware evolution and identify the relationship
among different malware samples. Understanding malware evolution will certainly
help us to better understand the connections between existing malware families and
might help us to detect new, zero-day malware.
This paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2, discusses background information
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about malware, malware types, malware analysis and malware detection. In Chap-
ter 3, we present background information on various similarity techniques used for
malware detection and analysis. Chapter 4 considers how morphing is used to create
different variants of a malware and how to simulate malware evolution based on such
morphing techniques. Details on our experiments are given in Chapter 5 and Chap-
ter 6 provides some analysis of these experimental results. Chapter 7 contains our
conclusions and discussion of future work.
2
CHAPTER 2
Background
In this chapter, we discuss about the malware classification and details on mal-
ware analysis and detection. Malware [9] is a general term used to refer any software
or program doing malicious or suspicious activity. Based on the malware behavior,
their replication nature and the infection mechanism, they are classified into many
types. They can be detected either from the way they are built (through static anal-
ysis) or the way they function or behave (through dynamic analysis). The following
sections cover the different types of malware and their detection techniques.
2.1 Types of malware
2.1.1 Virus
Computer viruses are similar to biological viruses. When executed, the viruses
copy themselves and spread through out the system. They are self-replicating [1] and
they do not spread through networks. The primary way the virus spreads to other
systems is through human interactions. When humans, intentionally or unintention-
ally, copy virus to a compact disk or a USB drive from an infected system to a new
machine.
2.1.2 Encrypted virus
Encrypted viruses [1, 7] are little more sophisticated form of viruses that use
encryption to avoid detection. In encrypted form the virus is not executable. It has
to be decrypted before it can be executed. The actual encryption techniques that are
used are very weak. They are simple obfuscation techniques to avoid easy detection
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and the encrypted virus body remains the same after each infection. Advanced virus
scanners can easily detect this type of virus.
2.1.3 Polymorphic virus
Polymorphic virus [1, 7] are very advanced and complex type of encrypted viruses.
They have several different decryptor loops that change after each infection. Some
known polymorphic viruses like Tremor [1] has over 6 billion decryptor loops that
change after every infection. This encrypted virus will be decrypted at runtime and
these viruses may or may not carry the morphing engine. Detecting polymorphic
virus is very challenging as they change their decryptor after each infection.
2.1.4 Metamorphic virus
Metamorphic virus [1] is an advanced form of viruses that change their body
after each infection. These viruses are not encrypted. So, instead of a decryptor loop,
they change, i.e. mutate after every new infection. These viruses have a mutation
engine that changes the body upon infection. There are known powerful metamorphic
viruses like Simile’s mutation engine [1]. The whole virus is less than 12000 lines and
it can exhibit metamorphism.
2.1.5 Worm
Worms are very similar to viruses except that they propagate through net-
works [1, 7]. They are capable of self-replication and it replicates to the infected
remote computers and executes self. Stuxnet [34] is a popular worm targeted on in-
dustrial control systems such as gas pipeline or power plant. The attacker modifies
the code of programmable logic controllers (PLC’s) to their intent and hide it from
4
the equipment operator. It is designed to damage the facilities by taking control of
the systems.
2.1.6 Trojan
A Trojan horse [1, 7] pretends to be a benign program but it does malicious ac-
tivity in the backend. They do not self replicate like worms and viruses. Most popular
ones are the password-grabbing programs. Citadel [32], Zbot [31], Zeroaccess [33] are
popular trojan malware and they are used to get confidential information from the
unsuspecting victims.
2.2 Obfuscation Techniques
This section discusses the different techniques used by hackers to evade standard
malware detection methods.
2.2.1 Dead code insertion
Malware writers frequently add junk code to the malware that never gets exe-
cuted. This is a very simple obfuscation technique to evade detection. These inserted
lines of code do not change the behavior of the program. Their primary purpose is
to change the way the malware looks in signature and opcode distribution. These
kind of added instructions are otherwise called as “Garbage Instructions”. Sometimes
they add code that may occasionally get executed but it does not really affect the
functionality of the program.
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2.2.2 Transposition
Blocks of code can be replaced to a different place in the same program to alter
the structure of the program. This can be either done by inserting jmp instructions in
between to make sure the execution path is not altered. Too many jmp instructions
in the program is a good heuristic that the code is been transposed a lot. The other
way to achieve transposition is subroutine transposition. Subroutines are moved to
different places in the program. For 𝑁 subroutines in a program, 𝑁 ! subroutine
permutations are possible. This cannot be easily detected compared to transposition
using jmp instructions.
2.2.3 Instruction substitution
Instructions in the program are replaced with the equivalent instructions and as
a result the structure of the program can be easily altered. Since the instructions
are replaced with the equivalent instructions, the functionality of the program is not
changed. In order to substitute opcodes with the equivalent opcodes, the malware
writer should have a good dictionary of opcodes and their equivalent opcodes.
2.3 Malware Detection Techniques
In this age of the Internet, malware detection is a multi-billion dollar industry.
There are several public companies like Symantec, McAffe, FireEye etc. that offer
commercial malware protection solutions for users.
2.3.1 Static analysis
In static analysis [1, 7], we use the architecture and the syntactic structure of
the program. The emphasis is on the actual opcodes that make the program. The
6
program is disassembled using tools like IDA Pro [5] to get the asm/opcodes of the
program that are used in analysis.
Signature based detection
Signature based detection [21] is the most popular method used by the anti-
virus companies to detect work based on the signature scanning. A signature is a
known pattern detected in the malware. When signatures of all known malware are
indexed in a malware signature database, they can be used to check new malware.
This scanning is done on-demand and it is very efficient. This is relatively easy and
fastest method to do the malware detection and this can scale well with the increasing
number of malware. When new malware is detected, we just add the signature to the
database. The disadvantage of this method is that signature scanning [1] can be easily
defeated by obfuscating the program and altering the signature. Metamorphic and
polymorphic malware cannot be detected using signature based scanning. Another
drawback is that this works only for known malware signatures. This cannot detect
any new malware. For a malware writer, this is easy to beat. Every time a new
malware variant is created, they can modify the signature and release it.
Static heuristics based detection
Instead of limiting the scan to only signatures, this method looks for code that
are “virus-like”. Heuristics like, finding junk code, use of too many jmp instructions,
decryptor loops, self-morphing code, decryptor loops and undocumented APIs are
red-flags that can be used to detect malware [1]. These heuristic based method can
be used to detect unknown malware as well.
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2.3.2 Dynamic analysis
Behavior monitor
Here we let the program to run in a controlled environment and observe the
actions. If actions are very suspicious the user will be asked to terminate the program.
Like static heuristics, here we look for dynamic heuristic to see if the program is a
malicious program.
Emulation
The malware is executed in a safe, emulated environment [1, 17] and the execution
of the malware is carefully monitored. Since the malware is not run on an actual
machine, this is safe. The junk codes are not executed and we can trace the execution
path of the malware. Thus the dynamic analysis is based on the execution of the
malware and so the layer of obfuscation is removed. Some malware are very intelligent
and they stop executing in an emulated environment, if it detects it is run in an
emulated environment. Some malware might alter their execution path to evade
malware detection and pretend to be doing benign activity. These kind of malware
can make the dynamic malware detection really difficult too. Though this is a robust
technique to detect malware, it is time consuming and it does not scale well with
the number of malware we deal every day in the common world. Modern anti-virus
companies are focussing more on dynamic analysis to make it more scalable.
8
CHAPTER 3
Similarity Techniques
Similarity techniques are widely used to compare malware. Malware can be com-
pared among themselves to identify how close they are. These comparisons greatly
help to identify commonality between malware. This information is useful in identi-
fying similar malware or the variants of the malware.
3.1 Cosine Similarity
The cosine similarity [13] is one of the most popular methods for computing
the distance or similarity between two vectors. It is a measure of a cosine of the
angle between them. The value of cosine distance can range from 1.0 for vectors with
same orientation and 0.0 for vectors at 90∘. Vectors that point in opposite directions
have a similarity of -1.0. For practical purposes, if vectors are in positive space,
the cosine distance is bounded in [0.0, 1.0]. It is important to note that the cosine
similarity measures only the direction, not the magnitude. Given two vectors, the
cosine similarity can be computed as given in the formula
cos(𝑎, 𝑏) =
𝑎 · 𝑏√︀|𝑎|2 |𝑏|2
Cosine similarity has been used successfully in information retrieval and malware
detection. In [35], they use cosine to build similarity between query and documents
for a search engine. In [36], cosine has been shown to capture the similarity in malware
successfully.
Given the malware 𝐴 and malware 𝐵, the malware is disassembled and their
opcodes are extracted. Frequency of the opcodes in each file is calculated and this
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becomes the term frequency vector 𝑣 for the file. Vectors of malware 𝐴 and 𝐵 , 𝑣1 and
𝑣2 respectively are obtained. Then the cosine distance between the malware vectors
𝑣1 and 𝑣2 is calculated using the cosine similarity formula.
3.2 𝑁-gram Similarity
𝑁 -gram similarity method [38] is a novel technique to compute the similarity
between different programs. Given two programs 𝐴 and 𝐵 and their opcodes, we
want to compute the similarity between them. To extract the opcodes, we ignore
and skip the labels, directives and new lines. 𝐴 and 𝐵 may have different length of
opcode sequences. Let 𝑛 be the opcode length of 𝐴 and 𝑚 be the opcode length of
𝐵.
Find the set of unique opcodes and assign a unique number to each opcode. For
the opcodes in 𝐴 and 𝐵, build subsequences of 3 consecutive opcodes. This results
in 𝑂(𝑚) triples for 𝐴 and 𝑂(𝑛) triples for 𝐵. While comparing the triples, the order
in which they occur does not matter. So, it is advisable to sort the 3 opcodes in a
triple in some deterministic order.
Build a boolean 2D matrix of dimensions 𝑚𝑛. Compare triples in 𝐴 with triples
in 𝐵. If 𝑖th triple in 𝐴 matches 𝑗th triple in 𝐵, mark the coordinate (𝑖, 𝑗) as a match
in the matrix. This results in the matrix where the matching indices are true. This
complexity of this operation is 𝑂(𝑚𝑛).
The 𝑁 -gram comparison of different types of morphing is shown in the Figure ??.
For identical files, we have a diagonal line. For insertion and deletion morphing, the
section of code that is inserted or deleted does not match the base version. For
transposition morphing, the moved code will still match in a different region.
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Figure 1: Ngram comparison
To eliminate noise resulting from random matches, we remove all matches whose
length is less than a chosen threshold of 5. Note that, based on the implementation
this can be a complex operation. For efficiency reasons, this is optional.
In the above steps, we find sequential matches between all opcodes of 𝐴 and 𝐵.
If the opcode files are identical, 𝐴 == 𝐵, then 𝑛 = 𝑚. The matrix will then be a
square matrix, where only the main diagonal is true. If the line appears away from
the diagonal, then the matching opcodes appear in different locations in 𝐴 and 𝐵.
To compute the score, for each of the files, 𝐴 and 𝐵, count the number of opcodes
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covered by the matching line segments (one or more). Normalize this number by the
total number of opcodes 𝑚 and 𝑛 respectively. This results in the ratio of opcodes in
𝐴 that match opcodes in 𝐵. The 𝑛-gram similarity is the average of these two ratios,
that is,
File score =
Count of matchset in file
Total number of opcodes
and
Total 𝑛-gram score =
Score for file 𝐴+ Score for file 𝐵
2
3.3 Opcode Graph Similarity
This is a graph based similarity technique used to detect similarity between
directed graphs [19]. A graph is a structure which consists of set of vertices 𝑉 and
edges 𝐸. A graph can be weighted graph or unweighted graph.
Opcodes are extracted from the assembly code of the malware and a list of
opcodes are obtained. A graph is constructed with opcodes as vertices and possible
transitions as edges. Edge weights are the probabilities of transitions. The resulting
graph is a digram statistics graph. The constructed graph becomes the signature for
the malware.
To illustrate opcode graph similarity, let us consider an example list of opcodes
as shown in the Table 1.
mov mov sub mul jmp cmp
cmp and cmp jmp mov lea
Table 1: Opcode sequence input for opcode graph
In the example opcode mov occurs after lea and so there is a transition from mov
to lea. Opcode add occurs after lea, etc. Using these transitions a matrix of the
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transition frequency can be formed, as in Table 2. In this opcode graph, the opcodes
are the nodes, weighted edges are the transition counts.
mov lea and jmp sub cmp mul
mov 1 1 0 0 1 0 0
lea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
and 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
jmp 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
sub 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
cmp 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
mul 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Table 2: Opcode digram frequency graph
The digram probabilities is computed from digram frequency count. Each value
in the row is divided by the sum of the values in the row. Table 3 shows the transition
probabilities among the opcodes.
mov lea and jmp sub cmp mul
mov 1/3 1/3 0 0 1/3 0 0
lea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
and 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
jmp 1/2 0 0 0 0 1/2 0
sub 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
cmp 0 0 1/3 1/3 0 1/3 0
mul 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Table 3: Opcode digram frequency probabilities
If 𝑁 is the number of distinct opcodes in the all the files, a graph of matrix
𝑁 ×𝑁 is constructed.
Each malware file is converted to a opcode graph of 𝑁 × 𝑁 . Let 𝐴 be opcode
graph of the malware base file 𝑎𝑖𝑗 and 𝐵 be the opcode graph of the malware file 𝑏𝑖𝑗.
The opcode graphs 𝐴 and 𝐵 are compared [19] and the score is computed as
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Figure 2: Opcode graph transition probabilities
given in the Equation 1.
score(𝐴,𝐵) =
1
𝑁2
(︃
𝑁−1∑︁
𝑖,𝑗=0
|𝑎𝑖𝑗 − 𝑏𝑖𝑗|
)︃2
(1)
If both the files are the identical we obtain 0 score. More the files are similar they
score less.
3.4 Hidden Markov Model
The Hidden Markov Model [11, 18] is one of the most popular machine learning
technique that works well on modelling sequences. It has been successfully used
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Figure 3: Opcode graph comparison
in speech recognition [11], speech synthesis, parts-of-speech tagging [15], alignment
of bio-sequences , time series analysis, etc. In recent years, HMM has been used
extensively in malware analysis [2, 3] and metamorphic virus detection.
The Markov property is that, all of the information required to compute the
future states depends only on the present state, not on any of the previous events
preceding the current state. In a conventional Markov model, the states are observ-
able, where as in a hidden markov model, the states are latent (or hidden) and they
emit observations that are visible.
Figure 4: Hidden Markov Model - state diagram
𝐴 1/2
𝐵 1/4
𝐶 1/4
𝐴 1/3
𝐵 1/2
𝐶 1/6
2/5
3/5
1/3
2/3
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The transition probability matrix is 2 × 2 matrix. 𝐴𝑖𝑗 is the probability to
transition from state 𝑠𝑖 to state 𝑠𝑗.
𝐴 =
(︂
2/5 3/5
2/3 1/3
)︂
The emission probability is a 2×3 matrix for 3 opcodes. 𝐵𝑗(𝑦𝑘) is the probability
to emit symbol 𝑦𝑘 in state 𝑠𝑗.
𝐵 =
⎛⎝ 1/2 1/31/4 1/2
1/4 1/6
⎞⎠
In malware analysis, we consider the opcode sequences as the observations and
assume that they are emitted by hidden states in the HMM. For these experiments
we use 2 state HMM. Each state has a emission probability of emitting one of the 𝑁
opcodes and a transition probability for all the possible states.
Figure 5: Hidden Markov Model
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𝑇 = length of the observation sequence
𝑁 = number of states in the model
𝑀 = number of observation symbols
𝐴 = state transition probabilities
𝐵 = observation probability matrix
𝜋 = initial state distribution
𝑂 = (𝑂0, 𝑂1, ..., 𝑂𝑇−1) = observation sequence.
𝑋 = (𝑋0, 𝑋1, . . . , 𝑋𝑇−1) = hidden state sequence for the observations
Table 4: HMM notations
There are 3 problems [2, 18] which can be solved using HMM. For these
problems, we use the HMM notation as described in Table 4.
Problem 1
Given the model 𝜆 = (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋) and the observation sequence 𝑂, find the probability
of the observation sequence being generated by the model.
Problem 2
Given the model 𝜆 = (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋) and the observation sequence 𝑂, find the optimal
state sequence taken by the HMM to generate the observed Sequence.
Problem 3
Given an observation sequence 𝑂, number of states 𝑁 and the number of observations
𝑀 , generate the model 𝜆 = (𝐴, 𝐵, 𝜋) that has the maximum likelihood of generating
the observation sequence. This is the training part of HMM. We use the Baum-Welch
algorithm [18, 26] to train a HMM using expectation-maximization.
Here in the experiments, solving problem 3 is the first step, which is the training
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Figure 6: Hidden Markov Model training and testing
part. First the model is generated with the list of opcodes from the base or original
malware as shown in the Figure 6. Solving problem 1 is the second step, testing part.
The morphed variants are scored against the generated model. The scores tell us how
similar the original and morphed malware families are.
The opcode sequences are extracted from the malware and HMM is trained with
the resultant observation sequences. HMM captures the properties of the malware
from the given observation sequence and this serves as the signature for the malware.
Given any new malware observation sequence, HMM can tell us how close the malware
are.
3.5 Other Similarity Methods
There are several other distance based similarity methods that have been used
in the literature. Toderici et al [30] have used Chi-squared distance to identify meta-
morphic virus detection. Baysa et al [4] have used structural entropy for malware
identification. Simple substitution distance [24] is another popular method used to
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compute similarity between two programs. Profile HMM [2] is a variant of Hidden
Markov Model has shown good results for malware detection. Deshpande et al [8]
have used Eigen value analysis for malware detection. Singular value d ecomposition
(SVD) [12] is another method successfully applied for malware analysis and detection.
In addition to the classical methods, there are other machine learning methods
that have also been used for malware analysis. Support vector machines (SVM) [28],
𝑘-means [29], logistic regression, naive nayes, neural networks [23] have been success-
fully used to detect malware.
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CHAPTER 4
Opcode Morphing Tool
Malware writers use several different techniques to create a new variant of a
malware. They add more features to make the malware more powerful and not easy
to detect. The existing malware can be made powerful by adding more features to
the malware and this in turn will increase or decrease the number of opcodes in the
instruction set. They can delete the easily detectable features to avoid detection and
to make it robust. They can also replace the existing opcodes with equivalent opcodes.
Subroutines are easy to move around to avoid detection. All of these cases occur as
the malware evolves over time. Here we simulate malware evolution by creating its
derived variants by insertion, deletion, substitution and transposition of opcodes.
Malware executables are first disassembled using disassembler like IDA pro [5]
and their respective assembly files are extracted. It is then easy to extract opcodes
from the assembly files. This opcode list is fed as the input to the morphing engine to
produce the morphed variants. The morphing engine takes two inputs - the malware
opcode file and the morphing ratio configurations to generate the morphed derivatives
of the malware. The input morphing ratios guide the morphing engine to trigger
morphing routines at appropriate locations in the input malware. The Figure 7 shows
the details of the morphing tool.
4.1 Configuring the Morphing Tool
The user inputs the morphing ratio for insertion, substitution, transposition and
deletion of opcodes. For the given malware, the tool takes the configuration input
containing the morphing ratios for deletion, insertion, substitution and transposition
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Figure 7: Morphing tool architecture
to generate the morphed variants.
The opcode list of the malware can be morphed by any of the four approaches
or the combination of approaches. The details of the actual morphing functions are
discussed in the following sections.
4.2 Deletion
In the deletion phase, the morphing tool deletes opcodes from the input mal-
ware. The number of locations at which this deletion happens is a function of the
deletion_morphing_ratio. If the ratio is 0.1, then we intend to delete opcodes at
10% of the locations in the input. We generate a uniform random number between
0.0, 1.0. If the random number is less than the threshold, 0.1, then we trigger the
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deletion phase. At each deletion location, we have a choice of deleting any number
of lines. To keep the result of the morphing realistic, we delete a random number (0
to 10) of lines. So, in some locations we might be deleting 1 or 3 opcodes and there
might be places where 10 opcodes are deleted. Deleting 10 lines of opcodes from a
opcode list is similar to deleting a block of code or subroutine from the program. The
Figure 8 shows the details of the deletion phase.
Figure 8: Morphing tool deletion
The morphing engine makes sure that each line of the malware is equally likely to
be morphed. In the malware deletion routine, we delete a random number of opcodes.
So, on average the deletion routine will trigger for 10% of the opcodes and we delete
one or more (up to 10) opcodes for each morph. As a result, the number of opcodes
in the output morphed version of a 10% deletion can be lesser than 90% of the input
opcodes. On average, a 10% deletion results in 38% reduction of opcodes in total
opcodes of the resulting malware.
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4.3 Insertion
In the insertion phase, we inject new code and simulate addition of new features
in the malware. Similar to the deletion phase, the number of locations where insertion
occurs depends on the insertion_morphing_ratio. If the ratio is 0.2, then we add
code at 20% of the places in the input malware. To keep the injection random, we
generate a random number between 0.0 to 1.0 and trigger the insertion phase when
it is lesser than the threshold.
The opcodeset from which the opcodes are inserted, can be curated by multiple
means. One can generate the distribution of the input opcodes and sample from
that distribution. This will keep the ratio of opcodes the same as the input mal-
ware. Another way is to sample opcodes randomly from a benign file [28]. In this
implementation, we choose the inserted opcodes from a set of all unique opcodes in
the malware family. We assign equal probability for all opcodes to be inserted. The
Figure 9 shows an example of morphing through insertion.
The number of opcodes inserted at each location is also random. We can insert
any number of opcodes from 1 to 10 at each location. If the malware writers change
an if statement, then it will result in 2-3 opcode change. If they insert a full sub-
routine, then it may result in a 10 opcode change. This experiment assumes that the
malware writers use a combination of approaches to generate the new variant.
4.4 Substitution
In the substitution phase, we substitute some opcodes with other opcodes. Sub-
stitution is a popular obfuscation technique because, it is fairly easy to identify equiv-
alent set of opcodes and substitute in the malware. For example, inc can be done
with add, sub can be replaced with dec and vice versa.
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Figure 9: Morphing tool insertion
To morph the malware with substitution, we replace a randomly chosen opcode,
with randomly chosen opcodes from unique opcode list. Each opcode in the list has
an equal probability to be chosen. The morphing tool generates a random number to
decides whether the opcode needs to be morphed. If the opcode needs to be morphed,
then it replaces the opcode with the set of opcodes of unique list.
At each substitution point, we remove the existing opcode and replace with up to
3 opcodes in its place. Instruction substitution might increase the number of opcodes
if we replace one opcode with many opcodes to do equivalent operation. Substitution
can also be viewed as deletion of an opcode and insertion of new opcodes in the place
of deleted opcode.
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4.5 Transposition
Transposition relocates a block of code to a different place in the file without
changing the execution state of the program. It only alters the structure of the pro-
gram. It can be achieved in many ways and the following ways are used to transpose
the code. Instruction transposition is another easy to implement method of obfusca-
tion. The malware writers frequently move the subroutines in the source file. If there
are 𝑁 subroutines, there are 𝑁 ! permutations of moving them to different parts of
the file.
There are two primary ways of implementing transposition, which are
∙ Adding jmp instructions to make sure the control flow is not lost.
∙ Transposing only subroutines. Here the subroutines are relocated to different
places in the program and there is no need to insert jmp instructions.
In the Figure 10 the original list of opcodes are relocated to a different places and
the flow of execution is not altered by adding appropriate jmp instructions between
the labels. In this implementation, the morphing engine currently does transposition
by moving subroutines. If the transposition_morphing_ratio is 0.001, we transpose
code 1 in 1000 of the locations. At each morphing location, we choose a block of code
upto 10 lines long. This block is moved 𝑛 lines. In our case 𝑛 is also random and can
vary between 1 and 10.
Transposing opcodes by adding jmp instructions increases the number of jmp
opcodes in the program and too many jmp instructions in the code is a good heuristic
to detect that it is a malware. One can easily reverse engineer the code and remove
the jmp instructions and reorder the labels to get the original code back.
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Figure 10: Morphing tool transposition
Morphing Ratio No of lines changed
10% 52%
20% 71%
30% 81%
40% 87%
Table 5: No of lines changed after transposition morphing
To estimate the amount of opcodes actually changed by the morphing techniques
discussed above, we compare the line count of the input and the line count of morphed
files here. The Table 6 shows the resulting size in the morphed file, when compared
to the input malware. When deletion is done at 10%, we actually delete 38% of the
opcodes and the resulting file size is only 62.07% of the input file size. We notice that
the during transposition, the file size does not change much. The small changes we
notice here are because of jmp instructions.
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Morphing Ratio Deletion Insertion Substitution Transposition
10% 62.07% 155.19% 110.03% 100%
20% 42.23% 209.53% 120.15% 100%
30% 29.86% 265.00% 129.93% 100%
40% 21.44% 319.88% 140.05% 100%
Table 6: Change in file size after morphing
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CHAPTER 5
Experiments
This chapter discusses the various experiments that are done to compare and
analyse malware variants.
The input for the experiments is a list of opcodes, extracted from malware sam-
ples. These are treated as the base opcodes for that malware family. These base
opcodes are morphed using morphing engine, described in Chapter 4 to generate sev-
eral morphed derivatives of the malware. For the sake of the following experiments,
I used morphing ratios of 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%.
These morphed outputs are compared and analyzed with several similarity meth-
ods discussed in Chapter 3. The similarity methods such as cosine similarity, 𝑛-gram
analysis, HMM and opcode graph similarity are used to detect the similarity between
base malware files and morphed malware variants. We should note that opcode graph
similarity is a graph based score [19], HMM [2] is a statistical-based score.
5.1 System Configuration
The experiments were done in a system with the following configurations.
∙ Intel Core-i7 processor, with 8 cores
∙ 8 GB ram
∙ Ubuntu 14.04 operating system
∙ The ROC plots were generated in Gnuplot 4.6
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∙ The box plots were generated in R version 3.0.2.
5.2 Datasets
We used different malware families in our experiments. Section 5.3 covers the
details of the malware families used in the experiments and the Section 5.3.5 covers
the benign files used for different malware families. Opcodes are then extracted from
the assembly code of the malware file. We then extract the list of opcodes from
asssembly code. For all testing, training, computation the extracted list of opcodes
is the input. All the opcodes are extracted statically and the list of opcodes we
extracted are based on the syntatic structure of the program.
5.3 Malware Datasets
The list of malware families used in the experiments can be found in the Table 7.
As discussed earlier the opcodes are extracted from the malware families and used as
an input. Different malware families are morphed using morphing tool to simulate
code evolution. Each variant is a new malware and we need to see how well the
similarity techniques work on the variants after applying morphing. The Figure 12
shows the distribution of opcodes in all malware families.
Malware Families No of files
WinwebSec 5819
Zbot 2168
Zeroaccess 1306
MWOR 100
Table 7: Malware datasets
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5.3.1 MWOR
MWOR stands for Metamorphic Worms. They change their form (i.e) their
internal structure [6, 25] but functionally they remain the same. This is used by
malware writers to evade malware detection based on signatures. More details on
metamorphism can be found in Chapter 2.
5.3.2 Zeroaccess
Zeroaccess [33] is a trojan designed to target the windows operating system. It
downloads the malware in the compromised machine and they use rootkit techniques
to remain invisible. Their file system is invisible in the compromised system [33] that
helps to download the malware.
5.3.3 Zbot
Zbot [31] is a trojan which infects and compromises the system [31]. It steals the
confidential information from the system. It is mainly targeted to steal the banking
information and other online credentials.
5.3.4 Winwebsec
Winwebsec [37] is a also a Trojan, targeted on windows operating systems. It
disguises as an anti-virus software and prompts false messages that the user’s system
is infected. Some users thinks they are legitimate software and pay for the software
to remove the malware threats.
The Figure 11 shows unique opcode count in the malware families. Zeroaccess
has more number of opcodes compared to the other malwares.
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Figure 11: Unique opcode count in malware files
5.3.5 Benign Datasets
In order to compare and analyse the malware datasets, we need non-malware
files to control the experiments. I used the common executables as benign files in the
experiments.
MWOR is a unix-based malware whereas winwebsec, zeroaccess and zbot are
targeted on windows operating system. For unix malware, unix benign files such as
sort, uniq etc. are used for testing. Other windows malware are tested with window
cygwin utility files. The Figure 13 shows the distribution of opcodes in benign cygwin
utility files. We notice that the opcode mov occurs far more frequently than all other
opcodes.
5.4 Experiments Setup
We discuss the setup of all the experiments done in this section. There are two
different types of experiments.
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Figure 13: Distribution of opcodes in cygwin files
5.4.1 Similarity between malware and morphed variants
In this experiment, we try to show the effect of morphing on the similarity scores.
The morphing and similarity computation is shown in the Figure 14. The steps to
compute the similarity between the malware and morphed variants are
∙ Extract opcodes from the malware. Let us call this base opcodes.
∙ Generate morphed variants using the morphing tool described in Chapter 4.
In these experiments, we generate 16 different morphed variants for insertion,
deletion, substitution and transposition morphing each with different morphing
ratios (10%, 20%, 30%, 40%).
∙ Compute similarity scores, comparing each of the morphed variants with the
base malware. We use four different similarity methods - HMM, cosine similar-
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Figure 14: Experiment setup 1 - Morph and compute similarity
ity, opcode graph similarity and 𝑛-gram similarity as discussed in Chapter 3.
The details on training the HMM and other methods are discussed in the next
Section 5.5
∙ Generate box plots from the resulting scores.
5.4.2 Detecting malware after morphing
In a real world scenario, if someone generates a new malware family by morphing
an existing family using any available morphing technique, we would like to detect
the malware. This experiment explores how well we are able to detect these morphed
malware by using the scoring methods discussed in Chapter 3.
The Figure 15 illustrates the experiment setup.
∙ Extract opcodes from the malware. Let us call this base opcodes.
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Figure 15: Experiment setup 2 - Detect morphed malware
∙ Generate morphed variants using the morphing tool.
∙ Use different comparison methods to detect the malware as opposed to the
benign files chosen in Section 5.3.5.
∙ From the generated malware and benign scores, generate ROC curve. The
details of ROC curve will be discussed in Section 5.10.
5.5 Executing Similarity Methods
In our experiments we used similarity methods such as hidden markov model,
opcode graph similarity, 𝑛-gram similarity and cosine similarity to detect the simi-
larity between the malware and their variants. Note that hidden markov model and
opcode graph similarity captures the statistical properties of the malware.
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5.6 Hidden Markov Model Similarity
To compare the malware derivatives using HMM, the experiment set up is de-
scribed here. For a specific malware family, say MWOR, we wish to compare the base
malware to different morphed versions like del_0.l, del_0.2 etc.
We take opcode sequences of base malware and concatenate them. This is the
observation sequence on which the model is trained. Generate HMM training data
from all of the input malware samples. The amount of training data required to train
a HMM depends on the number of parameters we estimate. In our case, the number
of estimated parameters is 𝑁 + 𝑁2 + 𝑁𝑀 . So a few hundred thousand observations
is enough to train a HMM model, for a two state HMM and a few hundred unique
opcodes.
The HMM is configured to be two states. This is based on prior research [38]
that has shown that two state HMM is capable of detecting malware. Train the HMM
using the unsupervised Baum-Welch [2, 18] method discussed in Chapter 3. Then the
HMM is trained with the observation sequences for sufficient number of iterations.
Here we used 1000 iterations and we noticed that the model converges well before 500
iterations.
The trained HMM model is then used to score the test files of the different
morphed versions. The result is normalized with the length of the morphed file to
get normalized score. We tested the all the four variants morphed with deletion and
generated a box plot to show their scores. The box plot gives the range of the scores,
the upper bound and lower bound of the scores. Like wise, the comparisons are done
for the other types of variants such as insertion variants, substitution variants and
transposition variants.
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In order to test how morphed families can be detected using HMM, HMM is
trained for each malware variant family. Here, we train HMM on 80% of the files
for each family and they are tested against the rest of the 20% of the malware files
and benign files. Scatter plots are generated for these scores and ROC curves are
used to show how well the morphed malware can be detected using HMM. Based on
the ROC, AUC is calculated. The Table 8 lists the number of files and number of
iterations used to train HMM model.
Malware Family No of Training files No of Iterations
MWOR 100 files 1000
Zbot 200 files 1000
Zeroaccess 100 files 1000
Winwebsec 250 files 1000
Table 8: Files used to train HMM
5.7 Opcode Graph Similarity Computation
To compare malware derivatives using opcode graph similarity, we generate op-
code graphs for the base malware file and the morphed malware variant. These opcode
graphs are then compared using the method described in Chapter 3 and similarity
scores are generated. Box plots are plotted to show the variance in the similarity
scores.
In order to see how well the opcode graph similarity method can detect variants
of a malware as against the benign files, we compute the opcode graph similarity
score for morphed malware:malware and morphed malware:benign pairs. If there are
𝑁 morphed malware files, we compare
(︀
𝑁
2
)︀
files to generate the malware scores. If
there are𝑀 benign files, then we do𝑁 ·𝑀 comparisons to generate benign scores. The
scores are then plotted in scatter plot and ROC is generated. The AUC is calculated
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from the ROC.
5.8 𝑁-gram Similarity Computation
To compare malware derivatives using 𝑁 -gram similarity, we compare opcodes
in the base malware file and the morphed malware files as discussed in Chapter 3.
Box plots are used to show the variance in the similarity scores.
To generate the ROC curves, opcode list from the same family are compared.
If there are 𝑁 files,
(︀
𝑁
2
)︀
files are compared and malware scores are generated. To
generate the scores for benign files, opcode list of the malware files and benign files
are compared. If there are 𝑁 malware files and𝑀 benign files , then 𝑁 ·𝑀 scores are
generated. The scores are then plotted in scatter plot and ROC is generated. The
AUC is calculated from the ROC.
5.9 Cosine Similarity Computation
To compare malware derivatives using cosine similarity, we generate opcode fre-
quency vectors for the base malware file and the morphed malware files. We extract
the opcode sequences from the base malware files and compute the frequency of the
opcodes in the file. This is the opcode frequency vector for the base malware files.
We do the similar thing for the variant malware file as well. Then the cosine distance
between the opcode frequency vectors is computed using the method described in
Chapter 3. We computed the cosine distance between multiple base files and their
variants. Box plots are plotted to show the variance in the cosine scores.
To generate the ROC curves, cosine distance of the files from the same family
are compared. If there are 𝑁 files,
(︀
𝑁
2
)︀
files are compared and malware scores are
generated. To generate the scores for benign files, cosine distance between the mal-
38
ware files and the benign files are calculated. If there are 𝑁 malware files and 𝑀
benign files, then 𝑁 ·𝑀 scores are generated. Scatter plots are plotted, ROC curves
are generated from scatterplots and then calculated AUC from ROC.
5.10 ROC Curves
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) [10] curve is a convenient way to eval-
uate the performance of the system. For a binary classifier, say for predicting malware,
there are two kinds of errors - malware classified as benign (false negative) and benign
classified as malware (false positive). Different applications can have very different
requirements for false negatives and false positives. Squashing the classifications to
two numbers - precision and recall loses a lot of information. Instead, generating an
ROC curve gives us the ability to visualize the performance of the system in a simple
plot.
In an ROC curve, true positive rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR) are
plotted [27], with different thresholds. We see how well the thresholds separate true
positives and false positives. The X-axis and Y-axis always starts at 0.0 and ends at
1.0. An example ROC curve is given in Figure 16.
5.10.1 Area under the curve
The area under the curve (AUC) is a good measure of the performance of a binary
classifier. The AUC can be calculated from the ROC curve using the trapezoidal
rule. For the points in the ROC curve, we compute the area covered by each pair
of neighbouring points with the trapezoidal formula and sum them. Since the ROC
curve is plotted on a unit square, the maximum value for AUC is 1.0 for a perfect
classifier. It is important to note that the AUC cannot be lower than 0.5. If we get
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Figure 16: Example ROC curve
an AUC less than 0.5, we can flip the match and nomatch conditions in the classifier
to get an AUC of greater than 0.5.
40
CHAPTER 6
Observations
The following sections discuss the results on the analysis of different similarity
techniques used to measure evolution of malware families MWOR. The opcode list
files from the MWOR malware family are morphed with different morphing ratios
using morphing tool as explained in Chapter 4. Then the similarity techniques are
applied to compare the morphed families and base families as explained in Chapter 5
and box plots are generated. In this chapter we discuss the results and details for the
MWOR family. The benign dataset used for this experiment is cygwin utilities. The
results, plots and graphs for other families can be found in appendices.
6.0.2 Note about reading figures
The Figures D.45, D.46, D.47, 20 have 8 plots each and here we explain the
different plots in figures. The figures are organized into two columns - the left column
with subfigures[a,c,e,g] have the results of experiment 1 mentioned in Section 5.4.1 and
the right column with subfigures[b,d,f,h] have the results of experiment 2 described in
Section 5.4.2. In Figure B.30(a), we compare the base opcodes with morphed variants
using HMM in Section 3.4. The box plots combine the scores of 100 different files for
MWOR. Figures B.30(c), B.30(e), B.30(g) compare the base opcodes with morphed
variants using opcode-graph, 𝑛-gram comparison and cosine similarity discussed in
Sections 3.3, 3.2 3.1 respectively.
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6.1 Deletion Morphing
The plots in Figure D.45 show the performance of different methods in compar-
ison.
∙ HMM: As the morphing ratio increases, the HMM scores do not change much.
This indicates that HMM is able to detect similar malware even after heavy
deletion morphing. If the code has only undergone deletion morphing, HMM is
a suitable technique to identify malware. The plot on the right Figure D.46(a)
shows that HMM models built from the morphed samples can be used to effec-
tively discriminate between morphed malware and benign files.
∙ OpcodeGraph: As we increase the morphing ratio, the scores of opcode graph
increase significantly. This is because of the fact, we delete more and more
opcodes and a lot of opcode to opcode transitions disappear. This is the reason
why the scores change significantly. The ROC plot Figure D.46(b) shows that,
opcode graph technique is able to split the files even after substantial deletion.
∙ 𝑁-gram: As we increase the code deletion, the scores of 𝑛-gram similarity
method decrease from 0.5 to less than 0.1. This is because of lot of missing
tri-grams in the input. Missing tri-grams lead to lesser matching trigrams and
hence lesser score. This makes the 𝑛-gram similarity well suited to measure
how much deletion morphing a program has undergone. The ROC plot Fig-
ure D.46(c) shows that, as we increase the morphing ratios, 𝑛-gram similarity
cannot effectively distinguish between the benign and malware files.
∙ Cosine: The box plot Figure B.30(g) shows that cosine similarity scores do
not change much when the morphing ratio changes. The total difference in the
scores is less than 0.01. Even after bulk code deletion, the cosine angle does not
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change much. The ROC plot shows that, cosine similarity is able to distinguish
between the benign and malware files. This can be attributed to very large
angles between benign and malware files in general.
6.2 Insertion Morphing
For insertion, we insert opcodes randomly from the input files. While compar-
ing the base opcodes and the morphed-with-insertion opcodes, we find that all four
comparison methods do reasonably well.
∙ HMM: With insertion morphing, HMM produces much lower scores when the
morphing ratio increases. As we insert more and more opcodes while morphing,
this introduces unseen opcode to opcode transitions in the resulting morphed
variant. Since the HMM has not seen these transitions it may have assigned
very low probability for these transitions. This results in increasingly lower
scores as we increase the morphing ratio. The ROC plot Figure D.47(a) shows
that HMM is still very powerful to detect benign files from heavily morphed
files.
∙ OpcodeGraph: As we add more opcodes, the opcode graph distance increases.
The ROC plot Figure D.47(b) indicates that opcode graph does not detect
benign and morph files well as the morphing ratio increases.
∙ 𝑁-gram: The 𝑛-gram scores decrease substantially as we insert more opcodes.
The ROC plot shows that 𝑛-gram similarity is able to detect malware and
benign files with a lot of insertion. In insertion we only introduce new tri-grams
and all existing tri-grams remain the same except at the boundary of insertion.
∙ Cosine: The scores of cosine is very similar to the deletion case.
43
6.3 Substitution Morphing
Here we compare the base opcodes with the morphed variants after substitution.
All four methods are employed for comparison.
∙ HMM: As the morphing ratio of substitution increases, the HMM scores change
significantly. This indicates that HMM is not able to detect that the morphed
families are variants of malware after insertion morphing. In substitution we
replace the original opcode with the opcodes from the unique opcode list. So
in a way, this can be viewed as deleting the opcode and inserting opcodes.
Substitution of opcodes increased the code from 10% to 40% for 10% to 40%
substitution respectively. In the Figure B.33(a) we can see that the similarity
score decreases from -15 to -35 for 54 % to 219% increase in the data and
Figure 20(a) shows that the score decrease from -10 to -30 for 10% to 40%
increase in the data. As we already know that HMM scores does not change
much after bulk deletion of opcodes, the morphing effect we see in HMM scores is
only because of insertion of data in substitution. For insertion and substitution
morphing, HMM stays same. Though HMM cannot say the variants are similar
malwares, the ROC plot in Figure D.48(a) shows that the HMM is able to
distinguish between malware variants and benign.
∙ OpcodeGraph: As we increase the substitution morphing ratio, the scores of
opcode graph increase and this explains that they are becoming dissimilar from
base malwares. For similar malwares opcode graph would score 0 and here we
can see that opcode graph scores are going up , shows that the base malwares
and morphed malwares are different. Also the ROC plot shows that opcode
graph does not do well after code substitution morphing and this shows that
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the opcode graph is not classifying benign and malware variants correctly.
∙ 𝑁-gram: As we increase the substitution ratio, the 𝑛-gram scores go from
0.4 to less than 0.05, indicating that they are becoming very dissimilar. We
observe from the Figure D.48(c) that the 𝑛-gram similarity is doing good for
substitution.
∙ Cosine:The box plot in Figure 20(g) shows that cosine similarity scores change
well, as compared to deletion. Even after bulk code deletion, the cosine angle
does not change much but for substitution the scores go down to 0.96 as opposed
to deletion. Substitution morphing has good effect on the malware and the
similarity methods cannot detect they are similar malwares. The ROC plot
shows that, cosine similarity is able to distinguish between the benign files and
malware variants. This can be attributed to large distance between the benign
and malware files in general.
6.4 Transposition Morphing
All the four methods shows no difference in the comparison scores. Cosine simi-
larity calculates distance between the opcode frequency vectors and in transposition
we only move the existing code in different places, we do not alter the occurrences
of the opcodes in the program. So there is no wonder cosine similarity scores 1,
while comparing all the four variants. Also we notice that all four methods do well
in detecting the malware after transposition morphing. In transposition here, we
do transposition using jmp instructions and did relatively less morphing when com-
pared to other morphing methods. For the malware families in the appendices, we
do subroutine transposition with a higher morphing ratios.
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The Table 9 shows the AUC values for different variants scored using different
similarity methods. We can observe that HMM and cosine similarity works well in
detecting the malware and benign files. For transposition all the four methods work
the same in classifying malware and benign because their similarity scores remain the
same and they do not change much.
AUC values for Morphed variants-MWOR
Method Resulting file size % Cosine 𝑁 -gram OpcodeGraph HMM
Deletion 63.07% 1 0.877 0.982 1
Deletion 42.23% 1 0.560 0.978 1
Deletion 29.86% 1 0.784 0.981 1
Deletion 21.44% 1 0.845 0.975 1
Insertion 155.19% 1 0.916 0.603 1
Insertion 209.53% 1 1 0.609 1
Insertion 265.00% 1 0.999 1 1
Insertion 319.88% 1 0.955 1 1
Substitution 110.03% 1 0.855 0.694 1
Substitution 120.15% 1 0.999 0.622 1
Substitution 129.93% 1 0.963 0.596 1
Substitution 140.05% 1 0.945 0.526 1
Transposition 100.20% 1 0.995 0.977 1
Transposition 100.41% 1 0.991 0.977 1
Transposition 100.58% 1 0.988 0.977 1
Transposition 100.79% 1 0.985 0.977 1
Table 9: AUC for MWOR
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Figure 17: MWOR deletion experiments
(a) HMM (b) HMM-roc
(c) OpcodeGraph (d) OpcodeGraph-roc
(e) 𝑁 -gram (f) 𝑁 -gram-roc
(g) Cosine (h) Cosine-roc
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Figure 18: MWOR insertion experiments
(a) HMM (b) HMM-roc
(c) OpcodeGraph (d) OpcodeGraph-roc
(e) 𝑁 -gram (f) 𝑁 -gram roc
(g) Cosine (h) Cosine-roc
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Figure 19: MWOR substitution experiments
(a) HMM (b) HMM-roc
(c) OpcodeGraph (d) OpcodeGraph-roc
(e) 𝑁 -gram (f) 𝑁 -gram -roc
(g) Cosine (h) Cosine-roc
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Figure 20: MWOR transposition experiments
(a) HMM (b) HMM-roc
(c) OpcodeGraph (d) OpcodeGraph-roc
(e) 𝑁 -gram (f) 𝑁 -gram -roc
(g) Cosine (h) Cosine-roc
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion and Future work
The morphing techniques described in this paper simulates real world malware
evolution by insertion, deletion, substitution and transposition of opcodes. The de-
veloping morphing tool is a general purpose morphing engine that can be used to
simulate real-world malware evolution and generate training data for malware anal-
ysis algorithms.
We did two main experiments - one to morph the malware and apply different
methods to compare the base malware with its morphed variants, two to analyse how
well the morphed variants can be discriminated from benign files. We applied four
different comparison methods in the above experiments.
We found that in most cases HMM performed better than the other methods.
Even after morphing ratio was increased to 40%, resulting in 200% change in the input
file, the HMM was able to detect malware from benign files. If we have multiple
morphed samples of a malware, taken at different stages of evolution, we can use
n-gram similarity and opcode graph similarity to correctly identify the position of
the malware sample in its evolution stages, assuming that the morphing methods
described above are used.
We studied the comparison methods using insertion, deletion, substitution and
transposition in isolation as well as combination of different comparison methods as
explained in Appendix E.
There is a big scope of improving and scaling this research project. One can apply
these techniques developed on several other malware families and compare with the
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methods discussed. This project is limited to using static opcode features from the
malware. One can extract function API calls or opcodes dynamically and run through
the morphing-comparison cycle. There is a lot of recent work on malware detection
using machine learning, especially in the field of deep neural-networks [22]. The above
experiments can be formulated in the deep-learning frame work.
In this morphing-tool implementation, while injecting new opcodes, we assumed
that all opcodes are equally likely. This assumption can be relaxed and we can sample
insertion opcodes based on its distribution in the input malware.
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APPENDIX A
Zeroaccess experiments
Figure A.21: Cosine mean scores
Figure A.22: Opcodegraph mean scores
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Figure A.23: N-gram mean scores
Figure A.24: HMM mean scores
Similarity Method Morph Vs Benign scores Morph Vs Morph
opcode graph 30 .30 = 900 30 choose 2 = 436
𝑁 -gram 30 .30 = 900 30 choose 2 = 436
Cosine 30 .30 = 900 30 choose 2 = 436
HMM Morphing ratio Total no of files No. of iterations
Deletion all 100 1000
Substitution all 100 1000
Transposition all 100 1000
Insertion all 40 1000
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AUC values for Morphed variants-Zeroaccess
Method Morphed data % Cosine 𝑁 -gram OpcodeGraph HMM
Deletion 37.91% 0.985 0.575 0.601 0.946
Deletion 57.89% 0.991 0.579 0.635 0.922
Deletion 70.18% 0.986 0.761 0.688 0.951
Deletion 78.59% 0.982 0.764 0.723 0.930
Insertion 54.93% 0.994 0.523 1 0.956
Insertion 110.05% 0.999 0.835 1 0.978
Insertion 164.99% 1 0.786 1 0.99
Insertion 219.76% 1 0.827 1 0.99
Substitution 10% 0.991 0.508 1 0.793
Substitution 20% 0.993 0.693 1 0.951
Substitution 30% 0.997 0.791 1 0.971
Substitution 40% 0.998 0.797 1 0.986
Transposition 52% 0.992 0.571 0.561 0.928
Transposition 71% 0.992 0.521 0.558 0.925
Transposition 81% 0.992 0.518 0.557 0.925
Transposition 87% 0.992 0.523 0.559 0.925
Table A.10: AUC for Zeroaccess
58
Figure A.25: Zeroaccess deletion experiments
(a) HMM-roc (b) OpcodeGraph-roc
(c) 𝑁 -gram-roc (d) Cosine-roc
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Figure A.26: Zeroaccess insertion experiments
(a) HMM-roc (b) OpcodeGraph-roc
(c) 𝑁 -gram-roc (d) Cosine-roc
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Figure A.27: Zeroaccess substitution experiments
(a) HMM-roc (b) OpcodeGraph-roc
(c) 𝑁 -gram-roc (d) Cosine-roc
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Figure A.28: Zeroaccess transposition experiments
(a) HMM-roc (b) OpcodeGraph-roc
(c) 𝑁 -gram-roc (d) Cosine-roc
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APPENDIX B
Zbot experiments
Similarity Method Morph Vs Benign scores Morph Vs Morph
opcode graph 30 .40 = 900 30 choose 2 = 436
𝑁 -gram 30 .40 = 900 30 choose 2 = 436
Cosine 30 .40 = 900 30 choose 2 = 436
HMM Morphing ratio Total no of files No. of iterations
Deletion all 200 1000
Substitution all 200 1000
Transposition all 200 1000
Insertion all 90 1000
AUC values for morphed variants-Zbot
Method Morphed data % Cosine 𝑁 -gram OpcodeGraph HMM
Deletion 37.91% 0.603 0.977 0.579 0.917
Deletion 57.89% 0.606 0.777 0.640 0.947
Deletion 70.18% 0.612 0.560 0.682 0.919
Deletion 78.59% 0.572 0.535 0.752 0.816
Insertion 54.93% 0.621 0.970 0.998 0.504
Insertion 110.05% 0.638 0.555 1 0.750
Insertion 164.99% 0.660 0.519 1 0.831
Insertion 219.76% 0.693 0.654 1 0.867
Substitution 10% 0.618 0.982 0.909 0.971
Substitution 20% 0.616 0.653 0.983 0.995
Substitution 30% 0.612 0.694 0.999 1
Substitution 40% 0.630 0.623 1 1
Transposition 52% 0.615 0.989 0.525 0.922
Transposition 71% 0.615 0.937 0.520 0.923
Transposition 81% 0.615 0.931 0.522 0.924
Transposition 87% 0.615 0.918 0.521 0.924
Table B.11: AUC for Zbot
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Figure B.29: Zbot deletion experiments
(a) HMM (b) HMM-roc
(c) OpcodeGraph (d) OpcodeGraph-roc
(e) N-Gram (f) N-Gram roc
(g) Cosine (h) Cosine-roc
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Figure B.30: Zbot insertion experiments
(a) HMM (b) HMM-roc
(c) OpcodeGraph (d) OpcodeGraph-roc
(e) N-Gram (f) N-Gram roc
(g) Cosine (h) Cosine-roc
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Figure B.31: Zbot substitution experiments
(a) HMM (b) HMM-roc
(c) OpcodeGraph (d) OpcodeGraph-roc
(e) N-Gram (f) N-Gram roc
(g) Cosine (h) Cosine-roc
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Figure B.32: Zbot transposition experiments
(a) HMM (b) HMM-roc
(c) OpcodeGraph (d) OpcodeGraph-roc
(e) N-Gram (f) N-Gram roc
(g) Cosine (h) Cosine-roc
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Figure B.33: Zbot n-gram insertion
Figure B.34: Zbot n-gram insertion
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Figure B.35: Zbot n-gram insertion
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APPENDIX C
Winwebsec experiments
Figure C.36: Cosine mean scores
Figure C.37: Opcodegraph mean scores
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Figure C.38: Ngram mean scores
Similarity Method Morph Vs Benign scores Morph Vs Morph
opcode graph 30 .30 = 900 30 choose 2 = 436
𝑁 -gram 30 .30 = 900 30 choose 2 = 436
Cosine 30 .30 = 900 30 choose 2 = 436
HMM Morphing ratio Total no of files No. of iterations
Deletion all 250 1000
Substitution all 250 1000
Transposition all 250 1000
Insertion 10% 250 1000
Insertion 20% 60 1000
Insertion 30% 50 1000
Insertion 40% 40 1000
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Figure C.39: HMM mean scores
Figure C.40: Winwebsec deletion experiments
(a) HMM-roc (b) OpcodeGraph-roc
(c) N-Gram roc (d) Cosine-roc
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Figure C.41: Winwebsec insertion experiments
(a) HMM-roc (b) OpcodeGraph-roc
(c) N-Gram roc (d) Cosine-roc
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Figure C.42: Winwebsec substitution experiments
(a) HMM-roc (b) OpcodeGraph-roc
(c) N-Gram roc (d) Cosine-roc
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Figure C.43: Winwebsec transposition experiments
(a) HMM-roc (b) OpcodeGraph-roc
(c) N-Gram roc (d) Cosine-roc
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AUC values for Morphed variants-Winwebsec
Method Morphed data % Cosine 𝑁 -gram OpcodeGraph HMM
Deletion 37.91% 0.663 0.602 0.791 0.936
Deletion 57.89% 0.619 0.511 0.808 0.933
Deletion 70.18% 0.639 0.616 0.831 0.928
Deletion 78.59% 0.634 0.643 0.862 0.923
Insertion 54.93% 0.646 0.563 0.994 0.676
Insertion 110.05% 0.665 0.583 1 0.522
Insertion 164.99% 0.689 0.685 1 0.515
Insertion 219.76% 0.717 0.666 1 0.547
Substitution 10% 0.642 0.578 0.827 0.841
Substitution 20% 0.640 0.568 0.958 1
Substitution 30% 0.654 0.647 0.996 1
Substitution 40% 0.671 0.678 1 1
Transposition 52% 0.637 0.632 0.757 0.939
Transposition 71% 0.637 0.599 0.755 0.938
Transposition 81% 0.637 0.599 0.754 0.938
Transposition 87% 0.637 0.566 0.752 0.938
Table C.12: AUC for Winwebsec
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APPENDIX D
MWOR experiments with linux utilities
Similarity Method Morph Vs Benign scores Morph Vs Morph
opcode graph 100 .100 = 10000 100 choose 2 = 4951
𝑁 -gram 100 .100 = 10000 100 choose 2 = 4951
Cosine 100 .100 = 10000 100 choose 2 = 4951
Similarity Method Total No of files CrossValidation No. of iterations
HMM 100 k = 5 1000
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Figure D.44: Distribution of opcodes in linux files
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AUC values for Morphed variants-MWOR
Method Morphed data % Cosine 𝑁 -gram OpcodeGraph HMM
Deletion 37.91% 1 0.990 0.986 1
Deletion 57.89% 1 0.871 0.986 1
Deletion 70.18% 1 0.721 0.984 1
Deletion 78.59% 1 0.619 0.988 1
Insertion 54.93% 1 0.780 0.902 1
Insertion 110.05% 1 0.694 0.546 1
Insertion 164.99% 1 0.867 0.948 1
Insertion 219.76% 1 0.858 1 1
Substitution 10% 1 0.883 0.918 1
Substitution 20% 1 0.639 0.864 1
Substitution 30% 1 0.815 0.770 1
Substitution 40% 1 0.810 0.700 1
Transposition 52% 1 0.997 0.987 1
Transposition 71% 1 0.989 0.985 1
Transposition 81% 1 0.984 0.983 1
Transposition 87% 1 0.979 0.983 1
Table D.13: AUC for MWOR
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Figure D.45: MWOR deletion experiments
(a) HMM-roc (b) OpcodeGraph-roc
(c) 𝑁 -gram-roc (d) Cosine-roc
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Figure D.46: MWOR insertion experiments
(a) HMM-roc (b) OpcodeGraph-roc
(c) 𝑁 -gram roc (d) Cosine-roc
80
Figure D.47: MWOR substitution experiments
(a) HMM-roc (b) OpcodeGraph-roc
(c) 𝑁 -gram -roc (d) Cosine-roc
81
Figure D.48: MWOR transposition experiments
(a) HMM-roc (b) OpcodeGraph-roc
(c) 𝑁 -gram -roc (d) Cosine-roc
82
APPENDIX E
Zbot combination morphing experiments
Morphing 1 Morphing 2 No. of training files No. of iterations
Deletion Substitution 250 1000
Deletion Transposition 250 1000
Substitution Transposition 250 1000
Insertion Deletion 250 1000
Insertion Substitution 200 1000
Insertion Transposition 200 1000
Similarity Method Morphed files Benign files
opcode graph 500 214
𝑁 -gram 50 50
Cosine 500 214
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Figure E.49: Deletion vs Substitution vs AUC for HMM
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Figure E.50: Deletion vs Transposition vs AUC for HMM
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Figure E.51: Insertion vs Deletion vs AUC for HMM
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Figure E.52: Substitution vs Transposition vs AUC for HMM
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Figure E.53: Insertion vs Transposition vs AUC for HMM
88
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.40.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Insertion
Su
bs
ti
tu
ti
on
A
U
C
Figure E.54: Insertion vs Substitution vs AUC for HMM
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Figure E.55: Deletion vs Substitution vs AUC for Cosine
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Figure E.56: Insertion vs Transposition vs AUC for Cosine
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Figure E.57: Deletion vs Transposition vs AUC for Cosine
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Figure E.58: Substitution vs Transposition vs AUC for Cosine
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Figure E.59: Insertion vs Deletion vs AUC for Cosine
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Figure E.60: Insertion vs Substitution vs AUC for Cosine
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Figure E.61: Insertion vs Substitution vs AUC for Opcodegraph
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Figure E.62: Deletion vs Substitution vs AUC for Opcodegraph
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Figure E.63: Insertion vs Transposition vs AUC for Opcodegraph
98
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.40.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Deletion
T
ra
ns
po
si
ti
on
A
U
C
Figure E.64: Deletion vs Transposition vs AUC for Opcodegraph
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Figure E.65: Substitution vs Transposition vs AUC for Opcodegraph
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Figure E.66: Insertion vs Deletion vs AUC for Opcodegraph
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Figure E.67: Insertion vs Substitution vs AUC for Ngram method
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Figure E.68: Deletion vs Substitution vs AUC for Ngram method
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Figure E.69: Insertion vs Transposition vs AUC for Ngram method
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Figure E.70: Deletion vs Transposition vs AUC for Ngram method
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Figure E.71: Substitution vs Transposition vs AUC for Ngram method
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Figure E.72: Insertion vs Deletion vs AUC for Ngram method
107
